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Speech acts and performances of scientific citizenship; examining how
scientists talk about therapeutic cloning

1. Introduction: Engagement and scientific citizenship
Scholars from the critical or constructivist Public Understanding of Science tradition (cPUS)
have been calling for public engagement in science, including public shaping of research
agendas1. These calls have been taken up unevenly by governments and other sponsors of
science-public interactions (e.g. see Irwin, 2006; Hagendijk and Irwin, 2006; Felt et al., 2009;
Kurath and Gisler, 2009). There is a therefore a need to continue investigating public
engagement, in particular where some voices are marginalised, whilst others are given great
authority.
To do this social scientists, following Irwin’s call, have started to examine how
“scientific citizens” are constituted -- that is which kind of person is constructed as
appropriate for public discussions and/or decision-making about techno-science (Irwin, 2001:
15). For instance, some science-public event organisers are shown to specifically seek out
“open-minded” and “innocent” members of the public, rather than those with established
opinions (Irwin, 2006: 315; see also Evans and Plows, 2007; Lezaun and Soneryd, 2007).
Others, through story-telling, encourage the participation of people with socially “situated
knowledges” (e.g. Scott and Du Plessis, 2008). Engagement activities thus are framed in
particular ways: they reproduce the institutional culture of those designing or implementing
them (e.g. Bickerstaff et al., 2010; Braun and Schultz, 2010).
Many of these studies explore scientific citizenship by investigating who is/isn’t
encouraged to speak, or how the event is organised (e.g. Irwin, 2006; Kerr et al., 2007; Felt et
al., 2009). Others examine the terms of reference of the consultation process and have found
that the latter tend to lead to the dominance of those who frame risk in a narrow scientistic
way, and to the exclusion of those who use broader definitions of risk that include social and
cultural factors (e.g. Robins, 2001; Genus and Rogers-Hayden, 2005; Wynne, 2005; Goven,
2006; Schibeci and Harwood, 2007).
There are also a number of studies that focus more specifically on how language can
be fundamental to the construction of scientific citizenship. They argue that particular

utterances can bring into being particular social relations: they can “perform” scientific
citizenship. For instance, depending on how science, doctors and expectations are described
in the media, the patient/scientific citizen is given a role as a passive object for medical
research, a consumer of science or an active fighter against his/her disease or the medical
system (Horst, 2007). Burchell (2007), building on Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), also argues
that scientists’ language in public can serve a performative function by delegitimizing
opponents, whose views are described as non-neutral and biased.
Here it is argued that Speech Act Theory (SAT) is a useful analytical tool for cPUS
scholars interested in scientific citizenship. A core insight of SAT is that language serves not
only to make true or false statements. Rather with language we can produce “speech acts”
and, to paraphrase Austin (1962), we do things with words. The success of these acts does not
depend on the truth content of the utterances, but on a range of other factors, related to the
“total speech situation” (1962: 148-51). This connects with the cPUS concnern with how the
framing of public engagement (including through language) can perform the act of, for
instance, excluding certain people from participation. In particular Butler’s (1997)
development of Austin’s work is particularly useful here since it offers a way of examining
the micro-level of language use (including in public settings), but also how this is embedded
in the macro-level of social contexts (including how some voices gain legitimacy above
others).
To show the potential usefulness of SAT, this paper examines how scientists talk, and
how this may affect public engagement. Because science-based worldviews tend to frame
public discussions about techno-science, scientists are key in science-public interactions (e.g.
Nelkin, 1975; Parry, 2009; Lysaght and Kerridge, 2010): they have high levels of recognised
authority, that is high levels of “symbolic power” (Bourdieu, 1975; Bourdieu and Wacquant,
1992: 148). The focus here is on how scientists in the field of stem cell research (SCR) in
Australia talked about the label “therapeutic cloning”2 whilst this technology was under
moratorium there.
In what follows, section 2 discusses SAT and how it may be useful to cPUS studies.
Section 3 provides some details about the background to SCR in Australia and about the data
sources drawn upon here. In Section 4, scientists in Australia are shown to problematise both
words in “therapeutic cloning” during interviews. This data is then used as a context to
examine the language they drew upon during the 2006 parliamentary review of stem cell

legislation. The final section discusses the potential of scientists’ language to enable different
types of scientific citizenship. It explores how these performances of citizenship may or may
not be successful, or felicitous, in practice. It argues that SAT can help identify ways of
promoting science-public interactions where citizens can better voice and explore their
concerns, and potentially shape regulation.

2. Speech acts and performances of citizenship
Speech Act Theory (SAT) makes sense of how language can change the social world. It was
first described by Austin (1962) in lectures published posthumously and was subsequently
codified by one of his students, Searle (e.g. 1969). It addressed a problem faced by traditional
philosophers of language who based their work on the truth conditions of statements and
therefore struggled to analyse utterances such as “I bet you five dollars she’ll win” or “I
promise to come tomorrow” (see Levinson, 1983: 226-83; Mey, 2001: 92-126). Austin
highlighted that statements are not always (true or false) descriptions -- what he called
constatives -- but instead can correspond to actions (such as betting or promising) -- what he
called “performatives”. As such, he posited that utterances can “perform” different kinds of
acts, and these are not limited by their grammatical form. For instance, not all utterances that
look like descriptions are necessarily used to state facts (e.g. Austin, 1962: 6-11).
Considering the performativity of language is important for those interested in public
engagement in science. Indeed, statements made during science-public encounters are not
simple descriptions of reality, but can play (explicit or implicit) strategic roles (e.g. Mulkay,
1994; Parry, 2003). Whether particular statements are accepted by others and contribute to
changes in the social world (e.g. legalizing an area of research) is not determined solely by
their truth content, but by other factors that SAT can help elucidate (see below). The notion
of performativity has been taken up by some cPUS scholars3, but only in broad terms (e.g.
Burchell, 2007; Horst, 2007). It is argued here that SAT can enable a more specific approach:
it offers a precise vocabulary to talk about the transformative power of language, and enables
the micro-analysis of language used in public engagement to be connected, through an
examination of “felicity conditions”, with different potential actions and outcomes.
According to Austin, utterance can be studied on three levels: firstly, at the level of
“locutionary act” (1962: 94-8) or act of saying, which corresponds to examining what is said;

secondly, at the level of “illocutionary acts” (1962: 98-100), which correspond to what social
action is performed through the speech act (e.g. ordering or promising). Thirdly, analysts can
examine “perlocutionary acts”, that is the intended or unintended effects speech acts have on
listeners: an utterance by one person may cause another to act in/feel a particular way (1962:
101-3). This separation between the three different types of speech acts is very useful.
Although it may be difficult in practice (e.g. Searle, 1968), analytically it is possible and
enables more precision: the separation gives the opportunity to specify what kinds of acts are
being performed, and by whom.
In the context of public engagement, a locutionary act such as “I will help educate
members of the public so that they can then enter into rational debate about these issues” can
perform an illocutionary act of promising (to educate the public). It may also cause the
perlocutionary act of silencing those who feel insufficiently educated. If these kinds of
utterances are dominant and frame public engagement, the only scientific citizens who can
easily play a role in decision-making become scientists and some highly educated publics.
The only form of participation open to other publics is to become more educated.
Importantly, these performative, unlike constatives, are not true or false, rather they are
“felicitous” or “infelicitous”; that is, the effects only take place if the right conditions are
present. Austin’s initial list of “felicity conditions” (1962: 14-5, see also 15-38) is for very
specific, ceremonial, speech acts. So when he concludes that all kinds of utterances can be
performative (1962, especially 121-64, see also Levinson, 1983: 231), he needs broader
conditions which take better account of the context of utterances -- the “total speech act in the
total speech situation” (1962: 148-51). These include the authority of the speaker and the
kinds of speech acts considered possible and acceptable: e.g., engagement is more easily
shaped by those with recognised legitimacy and who speak in accepted ways4. So a key
insight of Austin’s work is that the use of language is never merely the expression of beliefs
or a description of the world; to use language -- that is to participate in discourse -- is always
to perform an act in a social space. Butler’s reinterpretation of Austin’s work is helpful to
examine this in more detail.
Butler (1997) analyses a variety of speech acts in practice and specifically links these to
power, identities and social context. She argues for an understanding of language as able to
constitute people in particular ways -- for instance, hate speech can constitute people as
subordinate to others. She draws on Derrida to highlight that the power (or force) of a

performative does not simply emanate from the utterer and his/her intention, but from the
context -- meaning what is already sayable and doable (Butler, 1997: especially 51, 133). She
also draws on Bourdieu and his concept of habitus -- the sets of embodied norms that are so
taken-for-granted that we usually fail to realise that they shape our behaviour (Butler, 1997:
134-5; Bourdieu, 1980). She thus draws our attention to the social context which shapes what
speech acts can be performed and by whom.
In addition, Butler highlights the transformative power of speech: people can use
speech in non-authorized ways, and change the realm of what is acceptable. For example,
when African-American woman Rosa Parks refused to relinquish her bus seat to a white
passenger in segregated Alabama, Butler argues she performed a speech act that changed
what was doable and sayable (1997: 147-8)5. As such, speech acts can change the speech
situation. So Butler provides us with a set of felicity conditions that encompass symbolic
power of speakers, their relationships with active listeners and the norms of what is sayable
and doable in particular contexts.
Given scientists’ symbolic power, but also given the transformative ideals of cPUS, it
is interesting to investigate scientists’ speech acts and their performative dimensions. Studies
from cPUS have looked at scientists’ discourses and their interpretative regularities (e.g.
Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Mulkay, 1994; 1996; Kerr et al., 1997; Parry, 2003; Burchell,
2007), but do not always take into account power relations and social norms (see Gieryn,
1982). SAT as discussed above is an analytically useful tool to further develop this work: it
provides a mechanism to make sense of how scientists’ utterances connect with broader
social contexts and can explain how some acts are felicitous without needing to refer to truth
content. In addition, by enabling a detailed understanding of the different sorts of speech acts,
it not only highlights what forms of scientific citizenship these can perform, but also potential
alternative ways of talking and performing citizenship. Whether the particular utterances
investigated in this study succeed in changing social relations is beyond the remit of this
paper as it would require following each utterance and how it is accepted or rejected by
others. Nevertheless, because of the potential of these speech acts to bring about change, it is
important to examine them.

3. Therapeutic cloning, public engagement and scientists’ speech acts

Background
Australia has recently attempted to embrace more inclusive forms of public engagement. This
has however been limited in practice, especially in controversial areas (e.g. Schibeci and
Harwood, 2007; Katz et al., 2009). Stem cell research (SCR) has been the source of much
debate and stem cell researchers have been important stakeholders during Australian public
discussions of the regulation of embryo research and cloning (e.g. Robins, 2005; Harvey,
2005; 2008; Ankeny and Dodds, 2008; Lysaght and Kerridge, 2010). In 2002, legislation was
put in place making research on embryos from IVF legal under strict guidelines (Research
Involving Human Embryos Act, 2002) and the creation of embryos using cloning
technologies, whether for research or reproduction6, illegal (Prohibition of Human Cloning
Act, 2002). This instated a moratorium on therapeutic cloning. It was later lifted after a
parliamentary review of the legislation -- the Lockhart Review. This lead to the Prohibition of
Human Cloning for Reproduction and the Regulation of Human Embryo Research
Amendment Act (2006), which maintained the ban on reproductive cloning.
Although therapeutic cloning was under moratorium in Australia in 2002-6, it was legal
in other countries such as the UK. This permissive legislation was partly attributed to the
successful severing of therapeutic from reproductive cloning (Parry, 2003). A key strategy
was to rhetorically separate the two by avoiding the term “cloning” and replacing the label
“therapeutic cloning” with “somatic cell nuclear transfer” (SCNT) or “cell nuclear
replacement” (CNR). Similarly, in 2004, the International Society for Stem Cell Research
(ISSCR) decided at its annual conference that “nuclear transfer” should be used in preference
to “cloning”. The term “therapeutic cloning” was seen as a “commercial” term with “negative
connotations, “cloning” as not “accurate”, and “therapeutic” as “misleading” (see ISSCR,
2004).
However, Kitzinger and Williams (2005: 734-5) have noted that when scientists talk in
public they tend to use “therapeutic cloning” as, unlike SCNT, the label directly implies
therapies. Indeed, therapeutic promise has been an important part of promoting embryonic
stem cell research in general (Rubin, 2008). During the UK debates on stem cell research,
proponents of SCNT were keen to emphasise its potential therapeutic applications (Parry,
2003), in particular the promise of creating patient-specific therapies from cloned cells.
Similarly, the therapeutic potential of cloning technologies was emphasised in Australia in
the lead up to the 2002 Acts on embryo research and cloning (Harvey, 2005: 130). It is

therefore clear that choice of labels such as “therapeutic cloning” can be a key rhetorical
strategy7.
Interviews with scientists show that, even though their views are diverse (Davies,
2008a), for most of them science communication or public engagement is an opportunity to
educate the public (Kerr et al., 1997). Even for the minority of scientists who see a more
active role for members of the public, contributions of the latter are seen as secondary to
those of scientists (Young and Matthews, 2007) and scientific knowledge is put forward as
the ultimate guide and arbiter in decision-making about science (Davies, 2008b). The
dominance and widespread nature of these assumptions in interviews echoes the dominant
scientistic framing of public engagement discussed above8. As such, it is interesting to
examine how scientists talk during interviews and in more public settings, in particular since,
as Michael and Brown (2000) show, scientists’ accounts of engagement during interviews
can constitute citizens in particular ways.

Methodology
The present analysis draws on three sets of data. One is from the semi-private9 context of indepth semi-structured interviews with 31 scientists which took place in 2004-5 during the
moratorium on therapeutic cloning. Respondents worked in a range of sub-fields within SCR,
were of different levels of seniority and were located both in academic and commercial
research. They were recruited through e-mail. Some were first met at conferences but most
were contacted “cold”. They were identified through a combination of “purposive” and
“snowball” sampling (Gobo, 2004). No financial incentives were offered. The second and
third sets of data correspond to the written submissions made to the Lockhart Review and to
Hansard transcripts of the related 2006 parliamentary debates. These data form part of a
larger project examining how scientists talk about stem cell research and public engagement
in the UK and Australia.
Some interviewees are the same, or work in the same institutions, as scientists who
participated in the public debates. Due to the informed consent agreement negotiated with
participants in this study, the public and private utterances of particular individuals cannot be
directly compared. However, it is interesting to examine the overall contrasts between public
and private utterances. Interviews provide space for respondents to justify particular speech

acts they may choose to perform in public settings and to reflect on some of the norms that
may shape their behaviour. It is not argued that the voices used during interviews are more
authentic than in other settings (see Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Potter and Mulkay, 1985)10,
but they provide us with interesting additional data to make sense of public utterances, in
particular which kinds of speech acts are described as do-able, and which end up reproduced - or not -- in public11.
In the next section, the first two parts examine interview data where respondents
discussed the controversial labels therapeutic cloning and SCNT. Some potential speech acts
based on these discussions -- and which may be utilized in public -- are suggested, and their
performative aspects highlighted. This analysis is then used as a context for the third part
which examines actual speech acts used during public discussions. Speech acts are
recognised as utterances that do not just describe a situation, but do something. They are
further identified by using Austin’s formula: illocutions can in principle be expressed in the
form “in saying x [speaker] was doing y” and perlocutions in the form “by saying x [speaker]
did y” (to listener) (see 1962: 122)12. The conditions necessary for these speech acts to be
felicitous is examined in the concluding discussion.

4. “Therapeutic cloning” or “somatic cell nuclear transfer”? The importance of
labelling
“Cloning”: opening-up or closing down discussions?
As suggested above, “therapeutic cloning” can be a useful rhetorical tool. Interviewees
repeatedly commented upon this label. Some argued that SCNT was more appropriate and
accurate, others disagreed. An immunologist working with stem cells suggested that it was
necessary to change the label and no longer use the word “cloning” due to its connotations:
Ben13: The issue basically is people call it cloning, and it is therapeutic cloning, but my
God, all you’ve got to do is look at it from the science point of view and see what
you’re doing is taking a nucleus and putting it from one cell into another. It’s much
better to utilise the term nuclear transfer, because it is, it describes exactly what you’re
talking about and it’s devoid of all the hype, and devoid of the association with the
concept of cloning another human being, which is what basically what a lot of people
get upset about the possibilities of.

This quote is representative of many respondents. Ben was implying that “nuclear transfer” is
more accurate. He specifically highlighted that this label could serve to distance this
technology from reproductive cloning, thus preventing discussions from focussing on the
potential “slippery slope” that some people see between therapeutic and reproductive cloning.
It also helps to obscure the origin of the cells: the word “cloning” reminds us that the cells in
question come from a particular donor, whose genome is to be reproduced. By contrast, the
word “nuclear transfer” associates the technique with the laboratory, severing links to the
bodies of the cell/egg donors (see Parry, 2003). The implication here is that public debates
should focus on technical aspects and avoid raising all these concerns.
The label “cloning” was also seen as problematic by an adult stem cell researcher who
argued that it refers to too many biological processes to be useful:
Julian: I think one issue, getting back to the public-science debate is the, some of the
ambiguity of some of the terminology, […] the word cloning […] is unhelpful: you can
clone a gene, you can clone a cell, you can clone a person. […] the public doesn’t
understand. What they do understand is they don’t want a whole lot of human clones
walking up and down the main street and they get scared by that, so it’s an easy thing
for politicians to scare people. And scientists somehow need to use language carefully
to not confuse the debate. (emphasis added)

Many respondents described the public as ignorant and in need of simple clear messages
highlighting the promise of SCNT but not “muddying” debates -- as another scientist put it -with a confusing merger with reproductive cloning. There is a concern about others,
politicians here, using non-neutral emotive language to scare people.
This kind of reasoning may lead scientists to use labels such as SCNT instead of
cloning in public. Then, the locutionary act of saying for example “SCNT needs to be
legalised” can perform the illocutionary act of advocating an apparently non-controversial
technology. It can also perform the perlocutionary act of causing others to feel unable to raise
issues regarding the link between reproductive and therapeutic cloning, and the potential
effects on donors’ bodies. This could perform scientific citizens as people who are easily
confused and swayed by terminology and who need to be given simple facts so they do not
raise any misplaced concerns. The only citizens who should be involved in decision-making
here are scientists and a few rational/educated others.

One informant took a different approach. Although she agreed that “cloning” is not a
very accurate label for the process of nuclear transfer, she criticised the move to simply
change its name:
Heidi: [People] are not against the word [cloning], they're against the technique to make
children, so just because you call it nuclear transfer, they still should be against it,
you're just saying they don't understand what you're talking about because nuclear
transfer is meaningless. To me, that seems really stupid, why not just discuss the issue
[…]

Heidi argued that dissociating reproductive and therapeutic cloning by name would not help
resolve any difficulties. She portrayed these discursive changes as tactics to avoid difficult
conversations. She suggested that it was appropriate to talk about “therapeutic cloning” and
consider the issues that this label raises. She painted public engagement as an opportunity to
discuss any concerns members of the public may have. If Heidi’s apparent view here is
reflected in public, locutionary acts such as “let’s discuss the issues around cloning” will be
more common. These can perform the illocutionary act of calling for discussions of concerns
relating to cloning, and the perlocutionary act of causing the public to feel welcome to
participate. This performs citizens as people with valid concerns that need to be further
explored.

“Therapeutic” cloning? What can and can’t be said in public
Despite the common focus, in public, on therapeutic applications of nuclear transfer (see
above), most interviewees described this technology’s main potential to lie instead in basic
research. Only one highlighted the potential of SCNT in creating patient-specific organs for
therapy.
Philip, working on embryonic stem cells, criticised the label “therapeutic cloning”:
Philip: […] In the old days of the IVF debate in the UK there was an attempt to
substitute the term pre-embryo, to substitute for embryo, in what’s currently done in
IVF. I think the trouble with therapeutic cloning is that it’s a terminology that’s not
accurate. It’s not in and of itself therapeutic, the only goal isn’t therapy, it’s also
research. And it’s not cloning in the sense that cloning means to make a new individual,
it’s really, if you look at it in a scientific light, as cellular reprogramming. So it’s an

experiment with cultured cells. I think if we can get that idea across, we’ll have done a
good job (emphasis added).

This quote is worthy of note on three accounts. First, although Philip drew a parallel between
the rhetorical manoeuvrings during the current stem cell debates and those during the 1980s,
he did not portray the contemporary changes in labels as strategic. Rather, and this is the
second point of note, he placed himself and other stem cell researchers as neutral and
objective advice providers (Kerr et al., 1997) in search of accuracy. Third Philip, like most
respondents above, constructed public discussions as fora to get simple and accurate
messages across; a scientist’s role is to educate.
Many other researchers in Australia articulated this view that therapeutic cloning is
unlikely to directly provide therapies. For instance, Ben described it as “cumbersome”,
“technically very difficult and impractical” and “a hell of a trick to do”. Nevertheless, several
scientists wanted to push for its legalisation because it was described as needed “for the
research”, even if it probably would not be a useful technology in the long run.
This highlights the divergence between what stem cell researchers talk about in the semiprivate context of interviews -- the research potential of SCNT -- and what may filter out to
broader communities -- its therapeutic potential. One reason for this divergence can be found
in the following account by Philip, on embryonic stem cell research in general (rather than
specifically on cloned embryos). He was discussing the difficulty in explaining “as clearly as
possible the science behind everything”:
Philip: To give you an example, I think that actually in some ways one of the most
important contributions of embryonic stem cells in particular will perhaps not come
from their direct use in the clinic, but rather from their use as research tools […] But
it’s quite difficult to explain to the public. It’s much easier to explain to the public well
this might one day make this person walk. (emphasis added)

Philip was commenting on the debates in the lead up to the 2002 legislation on SCR in
Australia. The public is described as unlikely to possess sophisticated understandings of how
science operates, and in need of receiving simple messages, including promises of therapy.
Another scientist who worked with adult stem cells also argued that the value of SCNT
was more likely to be for research, rather than directly for therapy. Despite this, she argued
that she would highlight therapies when talking in public.

Rachel: I think it’s like anything, you’ve got to say there's a problem, there’s patients
with…, and stem cell transfer may offer a therapy […] .

Rachel articulated less discomfort than Philip with the idea of emphasizing less likely
therapeutic applications to the public.
These two interviews suggest that a likely public locutionary act about SCNT might be
“stem cell transfer may offer a therapy”. This can perform the illocutionary act of promoting,
rather than explaining, science. It can also perform the perlocutionary act of giving false hope
and preventing discussions of other, potentially better, routes to therapy and of whether
research tool potential is a sufficient justification for this research to proceed. If this type of
utterance dominates during public engagement, the only scientific citizens whose
participation would be encouraged would be scientists’, and their role would be to sell their
work; members of the public just need to be placated with empty promises of therapy.
By contrast, an adult stem cell researcher argued that SCNT was “not necessary” given
the promises of adult stem cells and suggested highlighting this in the upcoming public
discussions.

Public discussions about SCNT
The way respondents talked in interviews about therapeutic cloning and how it should be
presented in public is varied. This variety is echoed during the Lockhart Review. There are
however some important overall differences between the two data sets. Firstly, it seems
scientists were able to focus on the research rather than therapeutic promises, despite the
concerns regarding public understanding expressed above. Secondly, they did not primarily
replace “therapeutic cloning” with “SCNT”, despite most scientists above criticising the
former label.
Some public submissions written by scientists in support of SCNT highlighted its
promise as a research tool that may have implications for therapies in the future. For example,
the Australian Stem Cell Centre argued for “the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT)
as a means of deriving disease specific stem cells for research purposes under an ethical
license regime” (Inquiry into legislative responses to recommendations of the Lockhart
Review, 2006: submission no.63, emphasis added). They did not mention patient-specific
therapies. Other submissions emphasised both research and therapeutic applications: “only by

encouraging research with all forms of stem cells will benefits result to the community, both
of a scientific and therapeutic nature” (submission no.1).
By contrast, a stem cell company specifically highlighted that “at present the best
approach to generate patient or disease-specific stem cell lines for research and therapeutic
applications remains through the use of SCNT using human eggs” (submission no.104).
Similarly, a group of scientists from the Australian Stem Cell Centre highlighted the
importance of SCNT in both treatment and research into a long list of diseases, adding that
“SCNT also provides a potential route to generating immuno-compatible grafts for the
clinical application of stem cell therapies.” Nevertheless, they did strongly emphasise the
research importance of these cells, as a “unique opportunity to examine such disease states”
(Submission no.73).
When giving expert testimony to senators, scientists mainly focussed on the research
tool promises of SCNT. For example:
It is likely […] that the vast majority of initial gains from any type of embryonic stem
cell research or cloning research will relate to models of disease […] and that therapies
are well and truly a long way off. (Official Committee Hansard, 20 October 2006:
CA14)

In addition, a representative of the stem cell company discussed above also focused on
research as a worthy goal (Official Committee Hansard, 24 October 2006: CA4). This differs
slightly from what was raised in their written submission, which focussed on more direct
therapeutic applications.
A couple of scientists did highlight a potential “therapeutic cloning” scenario (Official
Committee Hansard, 23 October 2006, CA50). In addition, the imminence of therapy was
highlighted:
I will definitely be applying for a licence to go for SCNT, because that is a patientspecific therapy down the track. With the success we have in converting these cells into
different lineages, the time is not far away. (Official Committee Hansard, 23 October
2006: CA45)

This kind of language is rare though in the context of parliamentary discussions. The overall
focus was on research tool applications, which differs quite markedly from the language used
publicly by scientists in the UK to promote therapeutic cloning (as a patient-specific therapy).

In terms of labels, scientists constantly switched between “SCNT” and “therapeutic
cloning”. This indicates that concerns expressed about the misleading nature of the label
“therapeutic” were addressed by explicitly discussing research applications, instead of lesslikely direct therapeutic applications. The problematic association with reproductive cloning
raised by the use of the label “therapeutic cloning” was countered by explicitly supporting a
continued ban on the former practice.
During these Australian public discussions, locutionary acts similar to “It is likely that
[…] cloning research will relate to models of disease […] and that therapies are well and
truly a long way off” were common. These can perform the illocutionary acts of presenting
diverse potential promises of SCR and diverting the focus away from direct therapies. They
can perform the perlocutionary act of causing people to talk about the role of cloning
technologies in basic research. These speech acts perform scientific citizens as publics
capable of supporting cloning legislation, even if there is no direct promise of therapy.
Importantly though, the target publics here are elites: they are members of parliament who
will be voting on the legislation. So although this indicates a respect for non-scientists as
capable scientific citizens, it is not clear that this respect would extend to other members of
the public.
Based on the interview data, one could expect that most scientists’ public utterances
would focus on therapeutic promises and use the label SCNT. That this was not the case is
interesting. It suggests that their speech acts are shaped at different levels and do not depend
solely on what they put forwards as the best approach during interviews. This is further
discussed below.

5. Discussion and conclusions: Citizenship, felicity conditions and therapeutic cloning
Multiple speech acts
The interview data here show that scientists working in SCR talked about therapeutic cloning
in multiple ways. Most criticised the label “cloning” for being inaccurate and for making a
link between “therapeutic” and “reproductive” cloning. Many argued that the more technical
“somatic cell nuclear transfer” or “SCNT” should be used instead as it would prevent the
public from becoming unduly worried. One scientist, by contrast, argued for the need to use
the label that members of the public would understand (cloning), regardless of whether it may

connect to controversial reproductive cloning. She argued for broader discussions with the
public about their concerns. In parallel, most scientists indicated that therapeutic cloning may
have more use as a research tool than directly in therapies. Some therefore criticised the use
of the label “therapeutic” and suggested public debates should focus on the more promising
research applications of the technology. A few scientists however discussed the need to focus
on therapies in public in order to garner public support for research.
The common suggestions made during interviews regarding how one should talk
about therapeutic cloning contrast with the language that was in fact used in public. Most
scientists during the Lockhart Review did not avoid the label “therapeutic cloning”. In
addition, they did not focus their discussions (in writing or in person) on the therapeutic
promises of this work, but on its research promises (there are of course a few exceptions as
discussed above). This also contrasts with the usual focus on therapies during public debates
in other countries highlighted in section 3.
Speech Act Theory, in particular Butler’s reinterpretation of Austin’s work, highlights
that language choices can do things (like exclude potential participants in public
engagement). It also highlights that the felicity or success of these speech acts is not
connected solely to their truth content, and points instead to the importance of other factors,
such as symbolic power. SAT thus enables us to analyse scientists’ utterances in more depth
at the micro-level by considering their potential performative aspects. It also permits these
analyses to be connected to the macro-level by examining elements of the total speech
situation. From this we can suggest preferable alternative speech acts and also make sense of
the contrast between the public talk investigated here and other public talks as well as the
interview data from this study. I now turn to this in more detail.

Felicity conditions and performances of citizenship
Based on what scientists discussed during their interviews, a number of potential locutionary
acts that might be reproduced in public settings were put forward. These include “SCNT
needs to be legalised”, “Let’s discuss the issues around cloning” and “This research will lead
to therapy”. Some illocutionary and perlocutionary acts these might perform were then drawn
out. The former include advocating or selling therapeutic cloning, providing information and
calling for inclusive discussions about public concerns; the latter include causing people to

feel unable to discuss the link between therapeutic and reproductive cloning or the lack of
therapeutic applications, and encouraging broad discussions about the issues surrounding this
technology.
It was argued that, if these types of utterances were reproduced in public, they may
encourage people to perform particular types of scientific citizens. For instance, if scientists
are asked to speak in public contexts and keep repeating that “SCNT” must be legalised
(rather than saying that there are issues around “therapeutic cloning” which need to be
discussed), it is more difficult for a member of the public to interject, argue that SCNT is a
confusing label and push for a discussion of the link between reproductive and therapeutic
cloning. It is more likely that publics will take on a passive role: the technical labels help to
exclude those who do not have a technical background. In the same way, putting forward an
image of publics as uninformed and scientists as neutral information providers can create a
reality where engagement becomes education and scientific citizens are only those who have
been educated and accept a scientistic framing of the issues. By contrast, describing both
publics and scientists as having relevant concerns can create a reality where engagement
becomes respectful conversations between a diversity of scientific citizens who can challenge
the usual scientistic framing of engagement.
Importantly, for these performatives to be “felicitous” (Austin, 1962) -- here this means
for the suggested versions of scientific citizenship to be performed -- a number of conditions
need to be fulfilled. To examine this, as discussed in section 2, we should pay attention to
pre-existing and normalised ways of talking and acting, and to the symbolic power of those
who are talking. To use Butler’s words:
If a performative provisionally succeeds […] [it is because] that action echoes prior
actions, and accumulates the force of authority through the repetition or citation of a
prior and authoritative set of practices. (1997: 51, original emphasis)

I have argued that the framing of public engagement tends to privilege scientistic
worldviews; thus there exists an accepted set of practices whereby scientists tell others the
best way to approach a scientific issue. As such, scientists by definition will have great
epistemic authority; and their utterances are likely to be taken seriously.
In addition, a common and accepted role for scientists in public is to educate (e.g.
Davies, 2008b). This explains why many scientists in this study portrayed themselves as
providers of clear simple technical information (cf. Kerr et al., 1997) and made calls for

education. It also means that taking on this role in public will be accepted as normal: seeing
scientists as objective educators forms part of our habitual ways of thinking, and scientists are
very much encultured to see themselves as such. This explains the evidence here that the
deficit model of public understanding of science shapes many of these utterances. Most
interviewees expressed the desire to simplify or clarify debates so that the public can better
understand the facts, and not have irrational reactions. Few of them argued in favour of
listening to other valid forms of understanding (similar to Davies, 2008a; Parry, 2009). So
these scientists are not inventing the deficit model; they are replicating conventional ways of
talking and doing (Wright and Nerlich, 2006; see also Kerr et al., 2007 ).
Therefore, the speech acts suggested from Heidi’s interview data are unusual. By
arguing for open conversations about public fears, she is breaking with the deficit model
tradition. Similar to Rosa Parks’ refusal to move (see section 2), the unconventional speech
acts suggested by Heidi’s interview could play a transformative role if reproduced in public
settings. However, these may still need to be performed by the right kind of speaker in the
right context: as Parks needed to be the right kind of person making a statement at the right
time/place (Lovell, 2003), not everyone can challenge and transform the framing of public
engagement at any time. Perhaps someone like Heidi with the symbolic power that comes
from being a scientist speaking about science, in the context of an increased visibility of
cPUS views, might be the right person for this potentially transformative speech act: she is
more likely to change the habitual ways of organising public engagement than a citizens’
group calling for the inclusion of their views.
However, a corollary to this is that scientists who leave their conventional role of neutral
information providers risk their symbolic power. The status they gain by fitting their
conventional role can be lost if they are perceived to take on a different one. To draw on a
different example, scientists who want to effectively promote an area of research may need to
rigorously maintain their non-partisan/rational stance and ways of talking. This echoes
Lysaght and Kerridge’s (2010) argument that being able to describe one’s claims as
“scientific” and “value-neutral” is an important rhetorical strategy to improve one’s
epistemological, but also moral authority. It indicates that scientists can make the authority
they have in the scientific field relevant to the public engagement field, but they must be
careful to maintain their expected role. In parallel, they must avoid being seen as acting in a
strategic way: this can be more damaging to scientists -- because of their traditional role as
neutral information-providers -- than other groups such as politicians. These struggles

resemble those encountered by AIDS treatment activists attempting to transfer their authority
between different fields (Epstein, 1996). This situation helps us make sense of the difficulty
many scientists had with the idea of promoting areas of SCR by using language in explicit
strategic ways (e.g. Philip).
The total speech situation does not only include the speaker and their symbolic power.
The uptake of the message by listeners and the success of the speech acts will also depend on
other social contexts. These can be particularly important here in explaining the apparent
disconnect between the public talk that took place, and what might have been expected based
on the interview data and on other public discussions. For instance, a crucial element of the
total speech situation here is that, by the time of the Lockhart Review, several years had
passed since the early promises regarding the therapeutic potential of cloning. In addition,
these public discussions took place immediately after the initial claims by a laboratory in
South Korea to have successfully derived patient specific cell lines were shown to be
fraudulent (see Augoustinos et al., 2009 for an analysis of how this impacted on discussions
in the media and the scientific community). So continuing to make wide-ranging claims about
therapies when listeners know that these do not yet exist is difficult; in this changed context,
the speech act of promising cures is no longer as doable and sayable (Butler, 1997) as
previously (cf. Rubin, 2008) and performing it anyway risks making the speaker loose the
epistemic authority that derives from being seen as neutral and objective.
In addition, there had been a shift in the public debate in Australia. The Lockhart Review
took for granted that research on embryos should continue and it was constrained to focussing
on how the economic and scientific development of Australia could be encouraged “by
suggesting that restrictions be lessened and regulatory control be streamlined” (Harvey, 2008:
39). Thus the whole future of these scientists’ field was not in jeopardy, as it may have
seemed in the 2002 debates. As such there was no need to make extreme promises. This
suggests the importance of considering whether a technology is emerging or established (see
Brown and Michael, 2003) in shaping scientists’ speech acts and their felicity (see also
Burchell, 2007 who reminds us that scientists' language is shaped by the level of controversy
surrounding the area they are talking about). This can also help explain why in Australia most
interviewees found therapeutic cloning worth talking about. This contrasts to interviews
undertaken in the UK at a similar date and where the change of labelling suggested by the
ISSCR was not raised, presumably because the technology was already legalised (Marks,

2008). These examples illustrate how scientists’ talk is influenced by national policy and
international as well as local social and scientific contexts.

Transformative speech acts and further research
The main focus of Australian public debates in 2006 was not on distant therapeutic promises,
and the language used did not draw predominantly on technical labels that can mask ethical
and social issues. SAT, by embedding utterances in broader social contexts can contribute
towards a better understanding of this. In addition, it can help us find ways of fostering
conversations where different parties feel they can speak openly, even when the future of a
field may be under threat. I suggest that speakers with symbolic power recognised in the field
of public engagement in science -- such as scientists -- can play a key part: they can take on a
non-conventional role, advocate further public participation and challenge common
scientistic framings of engagement.
The focus of this work on scientists should not lead us to overlook others however,
especially those that may have felt excluded from these elitist parliamentary debates, which
focussed on “technical”, rather than “ethical” aspects of SCR (Harvey, 2008) -- that is,
scientists’ specialty. Further work should also explore in more detail how particular
utterances and labels are accepted or challenged, and whether they do bring about tangible
changes in the social world. It could additionally investigate how these speech acts and
performances of citizenship fit into broader models of democracy and how they are shaped by
public relations officers and other professional science communicators. It might also examine
how the speech acts of particular individuals change in different temporal, geographical and
social settings.
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Notes

1

Some examples include Irwin (1995), Irwin and Wynne (1996), Epstein (1996), Collins and Evans (2002),
Dietrich and Schibeci (2003), Braun and Schultz (2010) and Delgado et al. (2011).
2
Therapeutic cloning is the creation of embryos from cells such as skin cells with the aim of deriving cell lines
that immunologically match the patient who donated the skin cells. Other labels, e.g. somatic cell nuclear
transfer, can also be used but, as will be discussed here, are not quite synonymous.
3
Although see Szerszynski’s (1999) critique of Wynne specifically for not attending to the performative
dimensions of language.
4
These are not features that have been picked up by all of Austin’s followers. There are two schools of thought
based on his work (Sbisà and Fabbri, 1980): one focussing on the speaker and their utterance, the other
considering speech in their broader social context. The latter is drawn upon here, since the former is seen as too
formalized and theoretical, and does not enable an account, or the possibility, of social change (see Streek, 1980;
Mey, 2001 especially 320; Levinson, 1983, especially 240-2; Wood, 2011).
5
See the conclusion for a development of this interpretation.
6
Like therapeutic cloning, reproductive cloning involves creating an embryo from cells such as skin cells.
However, in contrast to the former, the aim is to implant the embryo in a surrogate and create a live animal that
is the genetic clone of the skin cell donor. This is how Dolly the sheep was created.
7
Stem cell scientists’ language choices are not always “merely strategic” though (see Hauskeller, 2005).
8
This is not to say that scientists’ language choices inescapably and uniquely constrain science-public
interactions. In keeping with Butler’s thesis, citizens can successfully resist the roles they are given (e.g.
Epstein, 1995).
9
The term “semi-private” is used here to indicate that although interview data can relate to the way one person
(the interviewee) relates to another (the interviewer), and therefore that interviews are not the same as data from
public fora such as debates, they are not “culturally unique”: interviews reflect dominant social and cultural
norms (Kerr et al., 1998; see also Potter and Mulkay, 1985).
10
In particular, the relationship established between interviewer and interviewee can shape the way they (both)
communicate. Here some respondents initially came across as hostile and defensive, but used more conciliatory
language once they realised the interviewer was not a journalist and had a background in science. It is
impossible however to tell exactly how each respondent perceived the interviewer at different times during the
interview.
11
Following Kerr et al. (1997), and to use Gilbert and Mulkay’s (1984) vocabulary, scientists’ utterances are
analysed here both as “topic” and “resource”.
12
Although Austin ultimately found this formula unsatisfactory (1962: 123-32), it is a useful guide in
identifying speech acts.
13
Pseudonyms are used here in accordance with the anonymity agreement reached with interviewees.

References
Ankeny, R. and Dodds, S. (2008) "Hearing community voices: Public engagement in
Australian human embryo research policy, 2005-2007", New Genetics and
Society 27(3): 217-32.
Augoustinos, M., Russin, A. and LeCouteur, A. (2009) "Representations of the stemcell cloning fraud: From scientific breakthrough to managing the stake and
interest of science", Public Understanding of Science 18(6): 687-703.
Austin, J.L. (1962) How to do things with words: The William James lectures
delivered at Harvard University in 1955 Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bickerstaff, K., et al. (2010) "Locating scientific citizenship: The institutional
contexts and cultures of public engagement", Science, Technology, & Human
Values 35(4): 474-500.
Bourdieu, P. (1975) "The specificity of the scientific field and the social conditions of
the progress of reason", Social Science Information 14: 19-47.
Bourdieu, P. (1980) Le sens pratique. Paris: Editions de Minuit.
Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L.J.D. (1992) An invitation to reflexive sociology.
Oxford: Polity Press.
Braun, K. and Schultz, S. (2010) "'... A certain amount of engineering involved':
Constructing the public in participatory governance arrangements", Public
Understanding of Science 19(4): 403-19.
Brown, N. and Michael, M. (2003) "A sociology of expectations: Retrospecting
prospects and prospecting retrospects", Technology Analysis and Strategic
Management 15(1): 3-18.
Burchell, K. (2007) "Empiricist selves and contingent "others": The performative
function of the discourse of scientists working in conditions of controversy",
Public Understanding of Science 16(2): 145-62.
Butler, J. (1997) Excitable speech: A politics of the performative. New York:
Routledge.
Collins, H.M. and Evans, R. (2002) "The third wave of science studies: Studies of
expertise and experience", Social Studies of Science 32(2): 235-96.
Davies, S.R. (2008a) "'A bit more cautious, a bit more critical': Science and the public
in scientists' talk" in Science and its publics, edited by A. R. Bell, S. R. Davies
and F. Mellor Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars.
Davies, S.R. (2008b) "Constructing communication: Talking to scientists about
talking to the public", Science Communication 29(4): 413-34.
Delgado, A., Lein Kjølberg, K. and Wickson, F. (2011) "Public engagement coming
of age: From theory to practice in STS encounters with nanotechnology",
Public Understanding of Science 20(6): 826-45.
Dietrich, H. and Schibeci, R. (2003) "Beyond public perceptions of gene technology:
Community participation in public policy in Australia", Public Understanding
of Science 12(4): 381-401.

Epstein, S. (1996) Impure science: AIDS, activism, and the politics of knowledge.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Evans, R. and Plows, A. (2007) "Listening without prejudice?: Re-discovering the
value of the disinterested citizen", Social Studies of Science 37(6): 827-53.
Felt, U., et al. (2009) "Unruly ethics: On the difficulties of a bottom-up approach to
ethics in the field of genomics", Public Understanding of Science 18(3): 35471.
Genus, A. and Rogers-Hayden, T. (2005) "Genetic engineering in Aotearoa, New
Zealand: A case of opening up or closing down debate?" in Science and
citizens: Globalization and the challenge of engagement, edited by M. Leach,
I. Scoones and B. Wynne London: Zed Books.
Gieryn, T.F. (1982) "Relativist/constructivist programmes in the sociology of science:
Redundance and retreat", Social Studies of Science 12(2): 279-97.
Gilbert, N.G. and Mulkay, M. (1984) Opening Pandora's box: A sociological analysis
of scientists' discourse. London: Cambridge University Press.
Gobo, G. (2004) "Sampling, representativeness and generalizability" in Qualitative
research practice, edited by C. Seale, G. Gobo, J. F. Gubrium and D.
Silverman London: Sage.
Goven, J. (2006) "Processes of inclusion, cultures of calculation, structures of power;
scientific citizenship and the royal commission on genetic modification",
Science, Technology, & Human Values 31(5): 565-98.
Hagendijk, R. and Irwin, A. (2006) "Public deliberation and governance: Engaging
with science and technology in contemporary Europe", Minerva 44(2): 16784.
Harvey, O. (2005) "Regulating stem-cell research and human cloning in an Australian
context: An exercise in protecting the status of the human subject", New
Genetics & Society 24(2): 125-36.
Harvey, O. (2008) "Regulating stem cell research and human cloning in an Australian
context: The Lockhart Review", New Genetics and Society 27(1): 33-42.
Hauskeller, C. (2005) "The language of stem cell science" in Crossing borders.
Grenzüberschreitungen. Ethische, politische und religiöse kontexte der
stammzellforschung., edited by W. Bender, C. Hauskeller and A. Manzei
Münster: Agenda Verlag.
Horst, M. (2007) "Public expectations of gene therapy: Scientific futures and their
performative effects on scientific citizenship", Science, Technology, & Human
Values 32(2): 150-71.
Inquiry into legislative responses to recommendations of the Lockhart Review (2006)
Submissions received by the committee.
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/clac_ctte/completed_inquiries/200407/leg_response_lockhart_review/submissions/sublist.htm [last accessed 28
August 2011].
Irwin, A. (1995) Citizen science: A study of people, expertise and sustainable
development. London: Routledge.

Irwin, A. (2001) "Constructing the scientific citizen: Science and democracy in the
biosciences", Public Understanding of Science 10(1): 1-18.
Irwin, A. (2006) "The politics of talk: Coming to terms with the ‘new’ scientific
governance", Social Studies of Science 36(2): 299-320.
Irwin, A. and Wynne, B., Eds (1996). Misunderstanding science? The public
reconstruction of science and technology. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
ISSCR (2004) Nomenclature statement. September 2nd, 2004
http://www.isscr.org/press_releases/nomenclature_statement.doc [last
accessed 13 August 2007].
Katz, E., et al. (2009) "Evolving scientific research governance in Australia: A case
study of engaging interested publics in nanotechnology research", Public
Understanding of Science 18(5): 531-45.
Kerr, A., Cunningham-Burley, S. and Amos, A. (1997) "The new genetics:
Professionals' discursive boundaries", The Sociological Review 45(2): 279303.
Kerr, A., Cunningham-Burley, S. and Amos, A. (1998) "Drawing the line: An
analysis of lay people's discussions about the new genetics", Public
Understanding of Science 7(2): 113-33.
Kerr, A., Cunningham-Burley, S. and Tutton, R. (2007) "Shifting subject positions:
Experts and lay people in public dialogue", Social Studies of Science 37(3):
385-411.
Kitzinger, J. and Williams, C. (2005) "Forecasting science futures: Legitimising hope
and calming fears in the embryo stem cell debate", Social Science & Medicine
61(3): 731-40.
Kurath, M. and Gisler, P. (2009) "Informing, involving or engaging? Science
communication, in the ages of atom-, bio- and nanotechnology", Public
Understanding of Science 18(5): 559-73.
Levinson, S.C. (1983) Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lezaun, J. and Soneryd, L. (2007) "Consulting citizens: Technologies of elicitation
and the mobility of publics", Public Understanding of Science 16(3): 279-97.
Lovell, T. (2003) "Resisting with authority: Historical specificity, agency and the
performative self", Theory, Culture & Society 20(1): 1-17.
Lysaght, T. and Kerridge, I.H. (2010) "Rhetoric, power and legitimacy: A critical
analysis of the public policy disputes surrounding stem cell research in
Australia (2005-6)", Public Understanding of Science 1: 1-16.
Marks, N.J. (2008). Opening up spaces for reflexivity? Scientists’ discourses about
stem cell research and public engagement. Unpublished PhD thesis,
University of Edinburgh.
Mey, J.L. (2001) Pragmatics, 2nd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Michael, M. and Brown, N. (2000) "From the representation of publics to the
performance of 'lay political science'", Social Epistemology 14(1): 3-19.

Mulkay, M. (1994) "The triumph of the pre-embryo: Interpretations of the human
embryo in parliamentary debate over embryo research", Social Studies of
Science 24(4): 611-39.
Mulkay, M. (1996) "Frankenstein and the debate over embryo research", Science,
Technology, & Human Values 21(2): 157-76.
Nelkin, D. (1975) "The political impact of technical expertise", Social Studies of
Science 5(1): 35-54.
Official Committee Hansard; Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs;
Canberra 20 October (2006) Reference: Legislative responses to the lockhart
review. http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9809.pdf [last
accessed 4 February 2011].
Official Committee Hansard; Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs;
Melbourne 24 October (2006) Reference: Legislative responses to the lockhart
review. http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9811.pdf [last
accessed 4 February 2011].
Official Committee Hansard; Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs;
Sydney 23 October (2006) Reference: Legislative responses to the lockhart
review. http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9810.pdf [last
accessed 4 February 2011].
Parry, S. (2003) "The politics of cloning: Mapping the rhetorical convergence of
embryos and stem cells in parliamentary debates", New Genetics and Society
22(2): 177-200.
Parry, S. (2009) "Stem cell scientists' discursive strategies for cognitive authority",
Science as Culture 18(1): 89-114.
Potter, J. and Mulkay, M. (1985) "Scientists' interview talk: Interviews as a technique
for revealing participants' interpretative practices" in The research interview.
Uses and approaches, edited by M. Brenner, J. Brown and D. Canter London:
Academic press.
Prohibition of Human Cloning Act (2002). Canberra: The Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia.
Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction and the Regulation of Human
Embryo Research Amendment Act (2006). Canberra: The Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia.
Research Involving Human Embryos Act (2002). Canberra: The Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia.
Robins, R. (2001) "Overburdening risk: Policy frameworks and the public uptake of
gene technology", Public Understanding of Science 10(1): 19-36.
Robins, R. (2005) "Biomedical innovation or bioethical precaution: The stem cell
debate in Australia" in Crossing borders. Grenzüberschreitungen, edited by C.
Hauskeller, W. Bender and A. Manzei Munster: Agenda Verlag.
Rubin, B.P. (2008) "Therapeutic promise in the discourse of human embryonic stem
cell research", Science as Culture 17(1): 13-27.

Schibeci, R. and Harwood, J. (2007) "Stimulating authentic community involvement
in biotechnology policy in Australia", Public Understanding of Science 16(2):
245-55.
Scott, A. and Du Plessis, R. (2008) "Eliciting situated knowledges about new
technologies", Public Understanding of Science 17(1): 105-19.
Searle, J.R. (1968) "Austin on locutionary and illocutionary acts", The Philosophical
Review 77(4): 405-24.
Searle, J.R. (1969) Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language London:
Cambridge University Press.
Streek, J. (1980) "Speech acts in interaction: A critique of searle", Discourse
Processes 3(133-54).
Szerszynski, B. (1999) "Risk and trust: The performative dimension", Environmental
Values 8(2): 239-52.
Wood, T. (2011) "Hermeneutic pragmatics and the pitfalls of the normative
imagination", Journal of Pragmatics 43(1): 136-49.
Wright, N. and Nerlich, B. (2006) "Use of the deficit model in a shared culture of
argumentation: The case of foot and mouth science", Public Understanding of
Science 15(3): 331-42
Wynne, B. (2005) "Risk as globalizing 'democratic' discourse? Framing subjects and
citizens" in Science and citizens: Globalization and the challenge of
engagement, edited by M. Leach, I. Scoones and B. Wynne London: Zed
Books.
Young, N. and Matthews, R. (2007) "Experts' understanding of the public:
Knowledge control in a risk controversy", Public Understanding of Science
16(2): 123-44.

